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A JUDICIAL MEDIATOR'S PERSPECTIVE:
THE IMPACT OF GENDER ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
MEDIATION AS A DIFFERENT VOICE
CHIEF MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAREN K. KLEIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past twenty years, mediation has become a commonplace and
increasingly preferred avenue for resolution of legal disputes.' During the
same time period, the number of women engaged in the practice of law as
litigators, corporate litigation supervisors, and judges has increased dramat-
ically.2 Are these two developments coincidental, or has the growing pres-
ence of women in the legal profession caused, or at least impacted, the rise
of mediation? This article explores the potential relationship between these
growing phenomena in the context of Carol Gilligan's premise, set forth in
her book In a Different Voice, 3 that women tend to take a relational, care-
based approach to resolving conflicts, while men tend to take an individua-
list, rights-based approach to conflict resolution.
At the outset, I acknowledge there are no empirical studies making the
connection between the increasing presence of women in the law and the
rise of mediation. Without such evidence, my conclusions necessarily rest
on my own experiential impressions and on the observations of other com-
mentators. I am well aware of the dangers in over-generalizing the role of
*J.D., 1977, University of North Dakota School of Law. Judge Klein serves as the Chief
Magistrate Judge for the United States District Court, District of North Dakota. Since her appoint-
ment to the bench in 1985, Judge Klein has conducted mediation proceedings in hundreds of civil
cases.
I thank my law clerk, Laurel R. Hanson, and Sarah Hradek, intern to Hon. Celeste F. Bremer,
U.S. Magistrate Judge for the Southern District of Iowa, for their invaluable assistance in
researching and editing this article. I also wish to express my appreciation to Judge Bremer and
her law clerk, Nancy O'Brien, for their helpful comments.
1. This shift from adjudication to mediation has prompted some judges and commentators to
bemoan the "vanishing trial." Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts 78 (ABA Litig. Sec. Symposium on the Vanishing
Trial, December 12-14, 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/vanishingtrial/
vanishingtrial.pdf.
2. In 1985, women comprised 13% of the legal profession. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
FACTS ABOUT WOMEN AND THE LAW 1 (1998), available at http://www.abanet.org/media/
factbooks/womenlaw.pdf. As of 2001, that percentage had risen to almost 30%, and by 2010, the
percentage of women lawyers is expected to reach 40%. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, THE UNFINISHED AGENDA: WOMEN IN THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 13 (2001) (hereinafter ABA UNFINISHED AGENDA).
3. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (Harvard Univ. Press 1993) (1982).
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gender, and I do not wish to exaggerate gender as a factor. Yet, Gilligan's
work does suggest a rough correlation between gender and approach to
problem solving.
This article considers the symmetry of the ethic of care identified by
Gilligan with facilitative mediation of legal disputes. First, I summarize
Gilligan's work in defining two moral perspectives, or "voices." Then, I re-
view the impediments that the adversarial system presents to those lawyers
who prefer a care orientation, most of whom, according to Gilligan, are
women. Next, I summarize the growth of mediation in the law, the nature
of the mediation process, and the relationship between mediator style and
moral perspective. I also consider the scope of mediation compared with
the scope of litigation and the cooperative style of negotiation compared
with traditional negotiation. In conclusion, I observe that mediation, at
least in its facilitative form, reflects Gilligan's relational, care-oriented
model, and that the presence of women in the legal profession has indeed
impacted the growing preference for resolving legal disputes through
mediation.
II. CAROL GILLIGAN'S ETHIC OF RIGHTS/ETHIC OF CARE
THEORY
A. BACKGROUND OF GILLIGAN'S INA DIFFERENT VOICE
Carol Gilligan began her research into the moral development of
women in the early 1970s following the United States Supreme Court
decision in Roe v. Wade.4 The topic appealed to Gilligan 5 because the Roe
v. Wade decision "made it legal for a woman to speak for herself and
awarded women the deciding voice in a complex matter of relationship
which involved responsibility for life and for death."6 She undertook the
first reported study to approach moral theory through an analysis of
4. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding that "the right of personal privacy
includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against
important state interests in regulation.").
5. Interestingly, Gilligan came to this subject somewhat through default. In her pursuit of a
field involving moral conflict that was real, not hypothetical, she had undertaken a study of
Harvard students facing the draft for the Vietnam War, when President Nixon announced the
termination of the draft and pulled U.S. troops out of Vietnam. As Gilligan says, "There went my
study." The 1984 James McCormick Mitchell Lecture: Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and
the Law-A Conversation, 34 BuFF. L. REv. 11, 37 (1985) [hereinafter Mitchell Lecture] (remarks
of Carol Gilligan). As she searched for another study topic involving judgment and action, the
Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade. Though she acknowledges her thinking was influenced by
the growing women's movement, Gilligan turned to the topic without giving consideration to the
fact that it would involve a study group of women only. Id.
6. GILLIGAN, supra note 3, at ix.
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women's language and thought. 7 As she interviewed pregnant women
weighing the decision whether to have an abortion,8 Gilligan noticed they
did not speak of their moral dilemma in adversarial terms-self versus
fetus-consistent with public discussion of abortion. Rather, they spoke
about their interdependence and connection with the fetus.9 They felt it
would be "selfish" to speak just for themselves. 10
In addition to the "abortion decision study," Gilligan performed two
other significant studies, the "college student study"" and the "rights and
responsibilities study."12 All three studies reflected Gilligan's assumption
that "the way people talk about their lives is of significance, [and] that the
language [that] they use and the connections they make reveal the world
that they see and in which they act."13 Her research led her to the con-
clusion that people speak or think from two separate moral perspectives.
She documented "a different moral voice in the decision-making proc-
esses" 14 of the women she interviewed.
This "different voice"' 5 represented a departure from the moral per-
spective and expected moral development observed in studies conducted by
other psychologists dating back to Sigmund Freud. 16 Notably, those earlier
studies were limited to male subjects, and the psychologists' conclusions
about moral development reflected that limitation. Gilligan drew a connec-
tion between the lack of female subjects included in the critical studies
underlying existing psychological theory and the problems she had encoun-
tered in interpreting women's moral development during years of teaching
and studying.17 Gilligan did not accept the premise of prior theory-building
7. Mitchell Lecture, supra note 5, at 46 (remarks of Carol Gilligan).
8. See GILLIGAN, supra note 3, at 72. The study involved twenty-nine women from different
backgrounds, interviewed during their first trimester of pregnancy and again at the end of the
following year. Of the twenty-nine women, four decided to have the baby, two suffered mis-
carriages, and two could not be contacted after the initial interview. Id.
9. Mitchell Lecture, supra note 5, at 38 (remarks of Carol Gilligan).
10. GILLIGAN, supra note 3, at ix.
11. Id. at 2. The college student study involved twenty-five college students enrolled in a
course on moral and political choice. They were interviewed during their sophomore and senior
years, and then again five years after graduation. Id.
12. Id. at 3. In the rights and responsibility study, researchers sampled 144 "males and fe-
males matched for age, intelligence, education, and social class at nine points across the life cy-
cle" about their concepts of morality and self, and their reactions to hypothetical moral dilemmas.
Id.
13. Id. at 2.
14. Mitchell Lecture, supra note 5, at 36 (remarks of Paul J. Spiegelman, moderator).
15. "Voice" is "a metaphor that can apply to many aspects of women's experience and
development." MARY FIELD BELENKY, ET AL., WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING: THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF SELF, VOICE AND MIND 18 (1986).
16. Id. at 22.
17. Id. at 1.
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research that women fail to follow the recognized pattern of moral develop-
ment. She posited that women were not failing in moral development;
rather, the research itself failed by not including women. 18
Gilligan's work is not about gender. Its focus is on perspectives, or
ways of moral thought, in dealing with conflict. Her work's association
with gender comes through her empirical observations, but that association
is not absolute. 19 She did not compare women with men; rather she com-
pared women with existing theory.20 The "different voice" she observed
stemmed from the very connection of the women subjects to others, for
instance, connection to the fetus in the abortion study. 2
1
This "different voice" appeared in Gilligan's other studies as well. One
of those studies, the rights and responsibility study, has particular appli-
cation to the practice of law and legal dispute resolution, although Gilligan
did not approach her work from a legal perspective. 22
B. RECOGNITION OF AN ETHIC OF CARE
In the rights and responsibility study, two eleven-year-old children, a
boy and a girl from the same school class, were asked to resolve a classic
moral dilemma constructed by Lawrence Kohlberg to measure moral devel-
opment. 23 The hypothetical involved a man named Heinz considering
whether to steal from a pharmacy a drug he could not afford to buy in order
to save the life of his ailing wife. Each child was asked whether Heinz
should steal the drug.
The boy, Jake, answered in classic moral theory fashion by weighing
the value of the wife's life against the druggist's property, concluding that
Heinz should steal the drug because "a human life is worth more than mon-
ey." 24 Essentially, Jake viewed the situation as "a math problem with hu-
mans" in which he arrived at his solution through logic. 25 Though stealing
is ordinarily a crime, the law had not contemplated this situation, and Heinz
was justified in stealing under the circumstances.
26
18. Id. at 2.
19. Id.
20. Mitchell Lecture, supra note 5, at 38 (remarks of Carol Gilligan).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 36. Gilligan's work has "provided important methodological precepts for rethink-
ing disciplines and institutions generally, and law, in particular." Leslie Bender, From Gender
Difference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan and an Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VT. L.
REv. 1,48 (1990).
23. GILLIGAN, supra note 3, at 25.
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The girl, Amy, approached the problem from the perspective of the
relationships among the individuals. She concluded that Heinz should not
steal the drug, reasoning, "I think that there might be other ways besides
stealing it, like if he could borrow the money or make a loan or something,
but he really shouldn't steal the drug-but his wife shouldn't die either." 27
When asked why Heinz should not steal the drug, Amy replied,
If he stole the drug, he might save [the life of] his wife then, but if
he did, he might have to go to jail, and then his wife might get
sicker again, and he couldn't get more of the drug, and it might not
be good. So they [Heinz and the druggist] should really just talk it
out and find some other way to make the money. 28
The responses given by Jake and Amy illustrate the main premise of
Gilligan's work: people operate either from a morality of rights29 or from a
morality of care, or responsibility. 30 Jake represents the ethic of rights, a
logical, hierarchical, impersonal perspective. This perspective places the
world in relation to self, with one's own self viewed as foremost and as sep-
arate from others. Problem solving in this moral perspective occurs through
application of abstract, objective rules. Amy represents the ethic of care, a
connected, nonhierarchical, relationship-centered approach, with a contex-
tual perspective. Such an approach places self in relation to the world,
which is viewed as a web of relationships to be preserved. The rights per-
spective prioritizes rules over relationships, and the care perspective would
change the rules in order to preserve relationships.31
Gilligan observed that men tend to exhibit a rights perspective, and
more women than men exhibit a care perspective, 32 but she specifically
noted that these perspectives are not gender specific.33 A small percentage
27. Id. at 28.
28. Id.
29. GILLIGAN, supra note 3, at 167. Gilligan alternatively called the ethic of rights the "ethic
of justice." Id. Some commentators object to use of the term ethic of justice to describe this per-
spective because "[b]oth ethics seek justice," yet the label suggests the rights perspective
approaches justice more closely than the care perspective. Bender, supra note 22, at 36-37 and 37
n.89.
30. GILLIGAN, supra note 3, at 164.
31. Id. at 164-65.
32. Mitchell Lecture, supra note 5, at 48 (remarks of Carol Gilligan). This finding can be
misleading. Gilligan does not state that most women choose a care orientation, only that women
exhibit that perspective more often than men. It is the male preference for the rights perspective,
not a female preference for the care perspective, that has led many commentators to over-
generalize by calling the perspectives male and female. See Naomi R. Cahn, Theoretics of
Practice: The Integration of Progressive Thought and Action: Styles of Lawyering, 43 HASTINGS
L.J. 1039, 1152 (1992).
33. GILLIGAN, supra note 3, at 2. Law review commentators have tended to equate
Gilligan's ethic of rights/ethic of care distinction as strictly male and female, resulting in
20051
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of men in her studies exhibited a preference for the care perspective, and a
significant percentage of women preferentially showed a rights perspec-
tive. 34 In addition, Gilligan found that "most people, male and female,
represent both voices in defining and resolving moral problems," 35 though
we may demonstrate "a very strong tendency to focus on one voice or
another," 36 with lesser presence of the other perspective.
I recognize in my own reading of Gilligan's work, and in the commen-
tary of others who have written about her theories, a temptation to use gen-
der as shorthand which thereby over-generalizes her findings. Such over-
generalization exaggerates the role of gender in her theoretical models and
creates a danger of misconstruction. 37 Gilligan's theoretical framework is
associated with gender through the tendencies shown by her studies, but her
work is not based on gender.
Gender, in any event, is a less than homogeneous category. There are
as many or more differences between persons of the same gender as be-
tween persons of different genders. 38 Not every woman shares a particular
trait, and not every person who has that trait is a woman; the same is true
for men.39 Yet, patterns emerge from Gilligan's work that illuminate the
consideration of moral perspective in the law.no
considerable criticism that its focus on gender "differences" will only serve to perpetuate
"women's subordination." Bender, supra note 22, at 39 (citing Catharine MacKinnon's remarks
from Mitchell Lecture, supra note 5). Bender has recognized such criticism as stemming from
"oversimplified" and "vulgarized" analysis of Gilligan's work. Id. at 16-17. Naomi Cahn recog-
nizes that society has constructed gender stereotypes which are neither "universally valid, or even
accurate constructions" of particular individuals. Cahn, supra note 32, at 1141.
34. One of Gilligan's studies showed that when women focused strongly on only one per-
spective, they split evenly in choosing an ethic of rights and an ethic of care. Men almost unani-
mously chose the rights perspective. GILLIGAN, supra note 3, at 25. See also Cahn, supra note
32, at 1052 (citing Carol Gilligan & Jane Attanucci, Two Moral Orientations, in MAPPING THE
MORAL DOMAIN 73, 81 (Carol Gilligan et al. eds., 1990)).
35. Mitchell Lecture, supra note 5, at 47 (remarks of Carol Gilligan).
36. Id.
37. Gilligan's work, when viewed in a gender context, has attracted opposing camps of
criticism, with one side arguing her theories of gender difference perpetuate the devaluation and
subordination of women, and the other side arguing that she advocates women are morally supe-
rior because of their differences. See generally Bender, supra note 22, (discussing various cri-
tiques). Gilligan herself cringes at the association of her work with such inquiries as whether
women and men really are different, whether any differences are a matter of nature or nurture, and
whether women are better than men or worse than men. Gilligan reveals that when she hears such
questions, "I know that I have lost my voice, because these are not my questions. Instead, my
questions are about our perceptions of reality and truth: how we know [what we know], how we
hear, how we see, how we speak. My questions are about voice and relationship." GILLIGAN,
supra note 3, at xiii.
38. ABA UNFINISHED AGENDA, supra note 2, at 30 (citing psychological research).
39. Bender, supra note 22, at 29.
40. Id. at 7, 25-26. The loose relationship between gender and moral perspective identified
in Gilligan's work is often attributed primarily to socialization patterns in our society, not to
biological factors. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux: Another Look at Gender, Feminism,
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III. CARE-ORIENTED LAWYERS AND THE ADVERSARIAL
SYSTEM
Women lawyers, like women generally, presumably exhibit a care-
oriented morality more often than their male counterparts. As care-oriented
people, these women lawyers use relational reasoning, through which they
approach problem solving from a contextual, connected perspective. This
value system often conflicts with their professional training.
Both legal education and the practice of law have traditionally focused
on rights, not on people or the relationships among them. 41 In its resolution
of conflict, the law stresses order and ignores human connection and
emotion.42 As students are educated in the law and its practice, they are
taught to "think like lawyers." 43 Historically, this has meant educating
lawyers to think from an ethic-of-rights perspective, approaching problems
with detached objectivity, applying rules and screening out other concerns,
including emotion, as irrelevant.44 Law students are bright people; they can
master the exercise of analytical skills, advocacy skills, and practical skills,
such as negotiation, from the perspective in which they are trained, whether
or not that perspective is their preferential moral base. Once students grad-
uate, they generally begin the practice of law under the guidance of one or
more lawyers experienced in the adversarial mode of practice. Conse-
quently, they are socialized to adopt a professional style compatible with
the prevailing rights-based system.45 Whether they are comfortable with
this style or not is another question.
Lawyers who naturally prefer a rights-based morality find the
adjustment to their professional role relatively easy, but those who reason
primarily through a morality of care experience tension between their
and Legal Ethics, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 75, 83 (1994) [hereinafter Portia Redux]. Girls are
socialized through connection to please and accommodate others, to listen and to show patience
and empathy. Boys, on the other hand, are socialized through separation to behave more individu-
alistically. Bender posits that instead of girls' relational socialization being viewed a problem in
the way we raise girls, "it is equally plausible that an ethic of care is a part of being human that
was inappropriately suppressed in men, rather than inappropriately encouraged in women."
Bender, supra note 22, at 42.
41. THANE ROSENBAUM, THE MYTH OF MORAL JUSTICE: WHY OUR LEGAL SYSTEM FAILS
TO Do WHAT'S RIGHT 192 (2004).
42. Thomas D. Barton, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Preventive Law, and Creative Problem
Solving: An Essay on Harnessing Emotion and Human Connection, 5 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L.
921, 927 (1999).
43. The demands of legal education and the professional role generally "trump gender
patterns in moral reasoning." Portia Redux, supra note 40, at 96.
44. Mary Jo Eyster, Clinical Teaching, Ethical Negotiation, and Moral Judgment, 75 NEB.
L. REV. 752, 756 (1996).
45. ABA UNFINISHED AGENDA, supra note 2, at 30.
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personal values and normalized professional expectations. 46 As they de-
velop a professional style, care-oriented lawyers must choose between
focusing on their preferred morality of care or on the moral perspective
valued by the profession. The majority of women in one study of law
students admitted feeling pressure to set aside their own values in order to
conform to the adversarial model. 47 If they choose to remain true to them-
selves and exhibit a morality of care as their professional style, rather than
conforming to the prevailing rights-based model of lawyering, they must
practice essentially as outsiders. Many choose instead to portray them-
selves in the traditional norm, emphasizing their morality-of-rights side in
their professional reasoning,4 8 which requires them to suppress their "voice
of care." 49 They "often feel unheard even when they believe that they have
something important to say."50 This suppression relegates their care per-
spective to the role of conscience, which causes them inner conflict.5' They
find it difficult to reconcile their professional face with their personal
values.52 The two perspectives exist in fundamental tension with one
another, and the adversarial system does not easily accommodate both
voices.5
3
Care-oriented lawyers may find the litigation environment overly com-
petitive and disconnected from the clients and their needs. A trial lawyer is
expected to analyze the merits and value of the client's position from a legal
standpoint and, perhaps, from a financial standpoint, but not usually from
an emotional standpoint. The lawyer presents the client's legal position to
the court, usually without addressing or understanding the client's emo-
tional needs. Knowing that trial is a highly unlikely event in contemporary
46. Jennifer A. Freyer, Note, Women Litigators in Search of a Care-oriented Judicial
System, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & LAW 199, 200-01 (1995).
47. Cahn, supra note 32, at 1051 (citing Suzanne Homer and Lois Schwartz, Admitted but
Not Accepted: Outsiders Take an Inside Look at Law School, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1
(1990)). Significant numbers of women lawyers have chosen career paths that avoid the confron-
tational litigation environment, and among those who have entered litigation practice, many have
left it out of frustration. Id. at 1045. David Chambers, Accommodation and Satisfaction: Women
and Men Lawyers and the Balance of Work and Family, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 251, 261 (1989)
(discussing a 1989 study of University of Michigan law graduates which showed that five years
after graduation, 70 percent of men worked in private practice, but only 44 percent of women
were in private practice).
48. Freyer, supra note 46, at 201, 214-15.
49. Eve Hill, Alternative Dispute Resolution in a Feminist Voice, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 337, 369 (1989-1990).
50. BELENKY, supra note 15, at 5.
51. Many litigators struggle to maintain the drive to "win" that the adversary system
requires. Care-oriented lawyers, in particular, are torn by their lifelong concern for the impact of
their actions on others. Freyer, supra note 46, at 209.
52. Freyer, supra note 46, at 203.
53. Mitchell Lecture, supra note 5, at 48 (remarks of Carol Gilligan).
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civil litigation, the lawyer nevertheless communicates to the court and
adverse counsel an expectation that the case will be tried. Also, rather than
taking the initiative to raise the issue of settlement and risk appearing weak,
a litigator often waits for the other lawyer to broach the subject. 54 The two
lawyers then negotiate with one another in a guarded fashion, trying to dis-
cover each other's strategy without revealing their own strategy.
Clients are rarely involved in the litigation process, unless they must
testify at a deposition or trial. They do not participate directly in traditional
settlement negotiations between the lawyers. Clients' motivations and the
origin of the dispute usually go unexplored. 55 When they do testify, liti-
gants often leave the courthouse feeling as though no one has listened to
them.56 Their rights may be vindicated through trial, but at the conclusion,
they are probably suffering financially, as well as emotionally.5 7 Litigation
never satisfies both parties; the outcome is win-lose, or, in some cases, lose-
lose.
The adversarial process, and the style of practice just described, em-
bodies the ethic of rights model and serves as the antithesis of the ethic of
care. As women have entered the profession in growing numbers, many of
them, joined increasingly by men, have expressed dissatisfaction with the
confrontational, competitive, client-distancing and client-disenfranchising
nature of the adversarial process.58 Their frustration with the adversarial
nature of litigation and their concern for their lack of connection with their
clients has led such lawyers to call for a more care-oriented approach to law
practice, 59 with less confrontation and better client relationships. 60
54. Eyster, supra note 44, at 759-60.
55. Barton, supra note 42, at 930.
56. Thane Rosenbaum, a novelist, essayist and law professor, remarks:
Oftentimes a trial is just a show trial.... The injured person is only patronizingly
allowed to say his piece, if at all, while everyone in the courtroom is doodling or day-
dreaming, or staring at the clock, or biding time until recess. The official hearing is
not accompanied by parallel listening. ... [L]awyers remain inured to both our words,
and our screams.
ROSENBAUM, supra note 41, at 63.
57. The law, "focused on the external world of observable human conduct rather than on the
labyrinths of interior pain," does not know or account for "the emotional history of hurts, griev-
ances, and motives that explains how citizens come to, or are brought to, the law in the first
place." Id. at 7.
58. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession Making
New Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 29,44-45 (1987) [hereinafter Excluded Voices].
59. Amy Cohen, Note, Gender: An (Un)Useful Category of Prescriptive Negotiation
Analysis?, 13 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 169, 169 (2003). Care-oriented law practice is intended to
benefit men as well as women, freeing them to express both voices. Hill, supra note 49, at 369.
60. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Future of the Legal Profession: Culture Clash in the
Quality of Life in the Law: Changes in the Economics, Diversification and Organization of
2005]
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Advocates of a care-centered style of lawyering have urged development of
dispute resolution processes that are not based in adversarial, competitive,
winner-take-all models. 61 They prefer "reconciliation of different positions,
rather than choice between them." 62
Recalling Gilligan's interview with Amy, who suggested a relation-
ship-oriented solution, "we can imagine a structure in which the parties
might talk to each other, we can imagine a structure in which the parties
might be asked to sit down and talk about whether the drug should be stolen
or financed in some other way." 63 One process that has the potential to
meet these criteria is mediation. 64
IV. MEDIATION: ITS NATURE AND GROWTH
A. THE RISE OF MEDIATION
Just as women began entering the legal profession in significant num-
bers, mediation was gaining recognition as a viable process for resolving
legal disputes.65 Generally, the initial impetus for alternative forms of dis-
pute resolution, including mediation, was the expense and delay encoun-
tered by litigants in the courts,66 but it also stemmed from alternate dispute
resolution's (ADR's) "less absolutist approach." 67 In the ensuing thirty
years, mediation has become institutionalized in our court systems and in
the private market.68
Lawyering, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 621, 639-40(1994) [hereinafter Culture Clash]; Bender,
supra note 22, at 46.
61. Bender, supra note 22, at 46.
62. Hill, supra note 49, at 342.
63. Mitchell Lecture, supra note 5, at 53 (remarks of Carrie Menkel-Meadow).
64. Id.
65. See Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Intersection of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Preventive
Law, and Alternative Dispute Resolution, PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1084, 1085 (1999)
(explaining that mediation and other forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) grew out of the
1976 Roscoe Pound Conference, which focused on the shortcomings of the adversarial system).
66. See Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1990) (requiring each federal district
court to conduct a study of its civil justice process and implement a civil justice expense and delay
reduction plan designed to "facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the merits, monitor
discovery, improve litigation management, and ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of
civil disputes."). The Act specifically required each court to consider ADR as a component of its
expense and reduction plan. 28 U.S.C. § 473(b) (1990). The subsequent ADR Act of 1998
requires each United States district court to offer at least one form of ADR. See 28 U.S.C. § 651
(1998).
67. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Forgetfulness, Fuzziness, Functionality, Fairness, and Freedom in
Dispute Resolution: Serving Dispute Resolution Through Adjudication, 3 NEV. L.J. 305, 307
(2003).
68. Louise Phipps Senft & Cynthia A. Savage, ADR in the Courts: Progress, Problems, and
Possibilities, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 327, 327 (2003).
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Critics of mediation express regret about the movement away from the
certainty and transparency of court-adjudicated resolutions and bemoan the
"vanishing trial." 69 Advocates of mediation express concern about the pu-
rity of mediation being diluted through its close connection with the court
system. They fear that through this association, mediation has become
more focused on rights, like adjudication, and less of a client-powered
resolution process. 70 These criticisms aside, mediation has become a signi-
ficant area of the practice of law, and it is effecting changes in the judici-
ary's own conception of its dispute resolution role.71
B. THE MEDIATION PROCESS
Mediation is a fluid, "dialogue-centered process" 72 in which a neutral
third party facilitates communication between two or more disputing par-
ties. 73 The process is confidential, informal and generally voluntary, al-
though some court ADR programs do mandate participation in mediation.7 4
The defining aspect is that the mediator lacks the power to impose a resolu-
tion or bind the parties to a settlement agreement.75 Mediation differs from
traditional negotiation not only in the involvement of a neutral third party,
but in the presence and participation of the disputing parties. The parties
are actively involved in the mediation process.
A mediation session generally involves the mediator meeting with both
parties, together with their counsel, if the parties are represented. It may
also include a series of caucus sessions during which the mediator meets
separately with one party and then the other. In the mediation process, the
parties have an opportunity to "tell their stories." 76 They may do so during
the joint session, but often they wait until the caucus to reveal information
about their position, their feelings, and their "authentic concerns." 77
69. See generally Galanter, supra note 1, at 1 (discussing the decline in courtroom trials).
70. Phipps Senft & Savage, supra note 68, at 328.
71. Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165, 195-96 (2003); Phipps
Senft& Savage, supra note 68, at 333.
72. ROSENBAUM, supra note 41, at 243.
73. Kate McCabe, A Forum for Women's Voices: Mediation Through a Feminist
Jurisprudential Lens, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 459, 460 (2001).
74. Id.; Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J.
1545, 1548 (1991).
75. Michelle R. Evans, Note, Women and Mediation: Toward a Formulation of an
Interdisciplinary Empirical Model to Determine Equity in Dispute Resolution, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 145, 150 (2001).
76. McCabe, supra note 73, at 462.
77. Id.
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Mediation offers the parties "voice and choice," the freedom to "speak
freely without constraints and rules" and to choose their own resolution. 78
The mediator plays an assisting role; the authority to settle belongs to
the disputing parties. In the process, the mediator engages the parties in a
search for a resolution acceptable to all. The mediator will gather infor-
mation from the parties, listen to their "stories," allow them to "vent" their
frustrations, and watch for obstacles as well as avenues to settlement.
Mediation has been called an archeological process, because the mediator
looks for motivations and solutions that are below the surface. 79 A good
mediator will defuse the air of mistrust and competition, and move the
parties beyond the dispute toward resolution.
Settlement is the goal, but a successful mediation is not necessarily
limited to one that achieves settlement. While settlement is clearly impor-
tant to the participants, research suggests that "most important is the quality
of the interaction at the mediation, including being respected, being under-
stood, being able to face the other person and talk or to have questions
addressed, and the responsiveness of the other person(s)."80
My own experience as a judicial mediator over the past twenty years
bears this out. A number of lawyers following mediation sessions have told
me that their clients derive more satisfaction from mediation before a judge
than they do from trial. These lawyers have remarked that their clients ex-
perience real benefit from conversing directly with a judge and the other
party. They feel someone has really listened to them. The clients feel their
emotional pain has been validated through the mediation process, and they
begin a healing process which moves them beyond the dispute to reclaim
their lives. This kind of feedback suggests the real benefit of mediation is
78. Phipps Senft & Savage, supra note 68, at 334.
79. KENNETH CLOKE AND JOAN GOLDSMITH, RESOLVING PERSONAL AND ORGANIZA-
TIONAL CONFLICT: STORIES OF TRANSFORMATION AND FORGIVENESS 7 (2000).
80. Phipps Senft & Savage, supra note 68, at 335. Phipps Senft and Savage refer to the
"core value" of mediation as "voice and choice," the opportunity to speak in one's own words and
to choose to listen to the other party. Id. at 334. They list settlement as only one of a number of
valuable outcomes:
Other positive outcomes include: the ability to speak, to be heard, and to talk about
what may be irrelevant in the litigation process, but very important to parties; narrow-
ing of important issues; clarity about what is most important to the participants; freer
more unfettered conversation between the participants; better understanding of those
involved and their situations; good faith restored; reputation and stature strengthened;
and agreements based on genuine terms created by the participants, both pecuniary
and non-monetary. The core value of mediation could be fulfilled even without com-
plete or total settlement, if in fact that is what the parties genuinely decided was the
best course to take. The core value of mediation could also be fulfilled even if the par-
ties decide it is best if the case continues through the litigation system, and the judicial
system determines the legal outcome.
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in the client's telling of his or her story, and not in the client sensing he or
she has achieved a better outcome than the other party.
C. MEDIATOR STYLES AND MORAL PERSPECTIVE
Leonard Riskin has identified two basic mediator styles: evaluative and
facilitative.81 An evaluative mediator will guide the parties overtly by
offering comments and opinions on the substantive outcome.82 A facilita-
tive mediator tries to clarify and improve communication between the par-
ties without injecting into the process the mediator's personal views on the
substantive outcome, 83 but a facilitative mediator "routinely offers both ad-
vice and substantive direction on matters of process." 84 A third style of
mediation, transformative, is often described as akin to facilitative media-
tion. 85 Transformative mediation utilizes the same format as facilitative
mediation, but it focuses on the parties and their relationship, not on settle-
ment of the dispute.86
Riskin has also identified two approaches to the scope of mediation:
narrow and broad.87 A narrow mediator will confine the discussion to the
legal dispute. A broad mediator will address the parties' interests, needs,
and motivations, although such factors are beyond the scope of the disputed
legal issues. Evaluative mediators tend to utilize a narrow approach, and
facilitative mediators tend to take a broad approach. 88 Evaluative media-
tion, with its narrow approach, is law-based, focusing on the parties'
relative strengths and weaknesses on the issues in dispute. Facilitative
81. See generally Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediator Orientations, Strategies, and
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 17 (1996).
82. Hensler, supra note 71, at 189. "[Tlhe [evaluative] mediator may 'reality test' a pro-
posed resolution, questioning the parties as to whether or not a proposed settlement suits the par-
ties' wishes; make predictions as to the outcome of the resolution; and advise the parties." Evans,
supra note 75, at 173-74.
83. Hensler, supra note 71, at 189.
84. Robert A. Baruch Bush, Substituting Mediation for Arbitration: The Growing Market for
Evaluative Mediation, and What it Means for the ADR Field, 3 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 111, 112
n.4 (2002).
85. Larry Spain and Kristine Paranica, Considerations for Mediation and Alternative Dispute
Resolution in North Dakota, 77 N.D. L. REV. 391, 399 (2001). Because this article focuses on
resolution of litigated disputes, I mention transformative mediation only in passing.
86. Riskin, supra note 81, at 23-24. A transformative mediator raises opportunities for the
parties to feel empowered and more self-aware, and to recognize one anothers' views. Spain &
Paranica, supra note 85, at 399. Through this process, the parties and their relationship improve,
and "[s]ettlement takes care of itself." Baruch Bush, supra note 84, at 112 n.4.
87. Leonard L. Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New
Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 8 (2003). Riskin notes that he would prefer the terms
"directive" and "elicitive" to "evaluative" and "facilitative," in part because they better convey the
goal of his original continuum, which focused on the impact of the mediator's behavior. Id. at 30.
88. Id.
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mediation is more contextual, taking into consideration the parties' interests
and needs, not just their legal positions. Facilitation requires more patience
and more listening 89 than evaluation, and it demands that the mediator
afford the parties more leeway in the content, tone, and result of the
discussion.
Most advocates of mediation consider the facilitative approach as the
only "true" form of mediation, favoring it because the facilitative model
embraces the historical and policy goals associated with mediation.90 They
charge that the evaluative approach destroys neutrality and the "rapport
necessary for truly productive interaction." 91 The facilitative approach, by
allowing participants to make their own evaluations and decisions, pro-
motes confidence and feelings of empowerment, which may help them cope
constructively with conflicts in the future. 92
Gender is often correlated with mediator style.93 Men are perceived as
competitive and goal-oriented, and thus are presumed to be better suited for
an evaluative narrow approach to mediation. Women, viewed as more nur-
turing and more responsive to emotional tones, are presumed to be better
suited for facilitative/broad mediation. Females are credited with personal-
ity traits such as patience, empathy and willingness to listen,94 which better
prepare them to mediate facilitatively. 95
My experience as a teacher of mediation skills for judges is consistent
with these generalizations. 96 Most male judges favor the evaluative ap-
proach. Female judges use evaluative techniques too, but they do not favor
evaluation as heavily as males. 97 Judges tend to gravitate toward evaluation
naturally, as a result of their adjudicatory roles. 98 Also, the lawyers and
parties involved in a judge-hosted mediation usually want-or say they
89. "Listening is part of the healing process-for everyone." ROSENBAUM, supra note 41, at
230.
90. Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediator Orientations: Piercing the
"Grid" Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 985, 990 (1997); Hensler, supra note 71, at 189.
91. Ellen A. Waldman, The Evaluative-Facilitative Debate in Mediation: Applying the Lens
of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 82 MARQ. L. REv. 155, 157 (1998).
92. Id. at 164.
93. David Maxwell, Gender Differences in Mediation Style and their Impact on Mediator
Effectiveness, 9 MEDIATION Q. 353, 362 (1992). The connection Maxwell draws between gender
and mediation style is "admittedly hypothetical." Id.
94. Cahn, supra note 32, at 1065.
95. Maxwell, supra note, 93 at 362.
96. The following observations are based on my experience as a faculty member at several
Federal Judicial Center Mediation Skills Workshops for federal judges.
97. Federal judges who attend the Federal Judicial Center Mediation Skills Workshop
usually complete a Riskin style mediation exercise.
98. This is another example of professional norm trumping individual preference in moral
reasoning. Portia Redux, supra note 40, at 96.
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want-to hear an evaluation from the judge, albeit only a favorable evalua-
tion, and most judges reportedly accommodate this desire for evaluation.
Women judges are generally more willing to try facilitation, and are often
better at it, although this is not universal. 99 When judges do learn the
facilitative approach,lOO they tend to use both approaches,O' usually starting
a mediation in the facilitative mode and switching to the evaluative mode as
needed if the parties approach impasse.102 Female judge mediators report
they tend to stay with the facilitative approach longer into a session than
male judges do.103 In the private sector, gender stereotypes seem to influ-
ence the parties' selection of mediators. On a national level, men are al-
most universally chosen to mediate large disaster and mass tort disputes.104
For practical reasons, such as the lack of time or lack of opportunity to
address individual interests, mediation of class actions or other disputes
involving a large number of claims tend to involve an evaluative model.
Males are also commonly chosen to mediate business disputes. The evalua-
tive style is typically used to mediate business disputes because most parti-
cipants presume such disputes involve only money. The parties and law-
yers often overlook the opportunity mediation presents to repair or build a
relationship for the future.
The difference between gender stereotypes in mediation style is most
crucial when the parties have shared a long-term or ongoing relationship.
Family disputes, for instance, require consideration of the parties' emotions
and the nature of their future relationship, so facilitative mediation is best
suited for such conflicts. Women tend to predominate mediation of family
law disputes, presumably because of the emotionally-charged dynamics and
relationship issues.
99. Some male judges have demonstrated excellent facilitative skills, and some females have
shown a strong evaluative bent.
100. In the federal judiciary, mediation instruction for judges focuses on development of
facilitative skills because of the tendency of judges to gravitate naturally to an evaluative mode.
101. This fluidity has prompted a description of mediation as an "eclectic" process. Stempel,
supra note 67, at 321.
102. I, along with other judges participating in Federal Judicial Center Mediation Skills
Workshops, tend to use this facilitative-to-evaluative approach when mediating.
103. Some writings opine that most female judges, while operating within their judicial roles,
"engage in contextual analysis, consider a broad range of factors, and tie their decisions less to
arbitrary rules than to flexible standards," suggesting an adjudicatory approach that is more
closely identified with the ethic of care than the ethic of rights. Michael E. Solimine & Susan E.
Wheatley, Rethinking Feminist Judging, 70 IND. L.J. 891, 891 (1995). This adjudicatory approach
closely resembles the broad, contextual style of facilitative mediation.
104. Interview with Donna Steinstra, Senior Researcher, Federal Judicial Center, in
Washington, D.C. (October 19, 2005).
2005]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
D. MEDIATION REMEDIES COMPARED WITH LITIGATION REMEDIES
As mediation has been subsumed into the litigation culture in the
United States court systems, it has tended to narrow toward a legal, rights-
based orientation. In its true, facilitative orientation, however, mediation
differs greatly from litigation in a number of respects: there is more client
involvement in mediation, and clients control the outcome. Litigation fo-
cuses on the adjudication of the parties' rights; it "is not about the repair of
relationships."105 The law, by adopting abstract rules and objective stan-
dards to provide certainty and predictability, has left out the possibility that
emotions and relationships could serve as useful adjuncts in problem
solving. 106
While litigation provides a sum-zero 07 result, mediation is not so
limited. Mediation offers the possibility of an array of remedies not avail-
able through litigation.108 Such remedies include continuation of a relation-
ship; consideration and resolution of other related disputes, either between
the same parties or other parties, that would have to be litigated separately;
apology as a healing device;109 and other non-monetary and emotion-
addressing resolutions. 10 By offering the possibility of solutions not avail-
able through litigation, mediation increases the likelihood of client satisfac-
tion with the result.
Carol Gilligan relates another story which has application here: Two
four-year-olds "were playing together and wanted to play different games.
The girl said: 'Let's play next-door neighbors.' The boy said: 'I want to
play pirates.' 'Okay,' said the girl, 'then you can be the pirate who lives
next door."l"l Gilligan terms the girl's proposal "an inclusive solution
rather than a fair solution."11 2 "The fair solution would be to take turns and
play each game for an equal period,""l3 so each child would have an
opportunity to play the game of his or her choice and "would enter the
105. ROSENBAUM, supra note 41, at 192.
106. Barton, supra note 42, at 933.
107. McCabe, supra note 73, at 474 (citing Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Altruism Possible in
Lawyering? 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 385 (1992)) (stating that "[Il]aw generally operates on a zero-
sum basis, that is, one pie that must be divided and the winner gets the bigger piece.").
108. Id.
109. "Apologies have enormous value, independent of any monetary settlement .... And, of
course, an apology can be not only costless to make, but enriching to the maker." ROSENBAUM,
supra note 41, at 179. "Acknowledgments and apologies offer moral relief, whereas purely legal
remedies, which compensate mostly for economic loss, provide only a very small spiritual
dimension." Id. at 189.
110. Evans, supra note 75, at 151-52.




A JUDICIAL MEDIATOR'S PERSPECTIVE
other's imaginative world."14 The games would not change. But, in the
girl's solution both games would change, resulting in a new, combined
game "that neither child had separately imagined. In other words, a new
game arises through the relationship."' 1 5 Mediation holds out the promise
of such inclusive solutions by providing a forum that gives voice to the care
perspective. 116
E. COOPERATIVE NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION
Some psychological studies and empirical research suggest that women
are more risk-averse and have a lower preference for competition than
men.1 17 Such findings have led to a general perception, despite research to
the contrary, that women bargain and negotiate more cooperatively than
men. 18 Because traditional negotiation is competitive in nature, coopera-
tion is viewed as a negative characteristic in negotiation. Empirical studies
indicate that women and men achieve comparable outcomes in negotiation
exercises,119 yet women are perceived by others-and often perceive
themselves-as less successful negotiators than men. 120 Such "stereotypi-
cal perceptions have undoubtedly disadvantaged women." 121 A negotiator
who is actually, or is perceived to be, cooperative or accommodating may
be vulnerable to the ploys of a non-cooperative negotiator.122 And, women
who tend to "lock into an unrelenting competitive stance when their part-
ners refuse to cooperate," perhaps to compensate for their perceived vulner-
ability, are viewed as "vindictive."1 23 The perception that cooperation
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. "By considering the specific needs of all the parties, as articulated from those parties'
own perspectives, and by attending to particularized contexts rather than abstract rights and uni-
versalizable rules, care-oriented problem-solvers frequently design creative, alternative solutions
that may never occur to their justice-oriented counterparts." Bender, supra note 22, at 37.
117. Charles B Craver & David W. Barnes, Gender, Risk Taking, and Negotiation
Performance, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 299, 345 (1999). See generally Muriel Niederle & Lisa
Vesterlund, Do Women Shy Away from Competition (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
paper 11474), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w 11474; Uri Gneery, Muriel Niederle &
Aldo Rustichini, Performance in Competitive Environments: Gender Differences, 118 Q. J. OF
ECON. 1049, 1049 (2003).
118. Carol Watson, In Theory: Gender Versus Power as a Predictor of Negotiation
Behaviors and Outcomes, 10 NEGOTIATION J. 117, 118 (1994).
119. Sandra R. Farber & Monica Rickenberg, Under-Confident Women and Over-Confident
Men: Gender and Sense of Competence in a Simulated Negotiation, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
271, 292 (1999); Craver & Barnes, supra note 117, at 347.
120. Farber & Rickenberg, supra note 119, at 291-92; Watson, supra note 118, at 118.
121. Craver & Barnes, supra note 117, at 347.
122. Watson, supra note 118, at 118.
123. Id.
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signals weakness may suppress cooperative tendencies in negotiators, both
men and women, leading to heightened competition and mistrust. 
12 4
Lawyers who are disadvantaged by the traditional, competitive negotia-
tion approach can benefit significantly from the involvement of a mediator
in their negotiations. A competent mediator will build an environment of
trust, tone down the competitive atmosphere, and strive to keep the
negotiation cooperative in nature. The mediator accomplishes this task by
providing a calming, tension-defusing environment, by expecting and
modeling cooperation and candor throughout the process, and by dis-
couraging and filtering out any manipulative strategies and confrontational
statements. 125 This atmosphere allows cooperative negotiators to focus on
problem solving methods that incorporate reconciliation rather than
aggressive posturing.' 26 Problem solving through reconciliation is partic-
ularly beneficial when the parties have shared or may form a long-term
relationship. 127
When I began conducting judicial mediation about twenty years ago,
there was virtually no mediation-public or private-in our regional legal
culture. Young lawyers, of whom women lawyers constituted only a small
subset, were the first to embrace the availability of judicial mediation.
Frequently, the more trial and negotiation experience male lawyers pos-
sessed, the more resistance they showed to the idea of a judge or private
neutral mediator facilitating their negotiations. Lawyers did not trust the
mediation process and often tried to use the session simply as an
opportunity to learn about the other party's strategy and weaknesses.
Experienced trial lawyers also found it difficult to listen to the other party.
They approached mediation as an opportunity to convince their adversary
and the mediator of the strength of their position, with an apparent
expectation that their persuasiveness would compel an agreement on favor-
able terms. 128 That tactic rarely, if ever, resulted in settlement. Usually,
upon failing to persuade or refute the other party, these lawyers would give
124. Reform efforts in teaching negotiation courses have proposed making more "visible the
collaborative and connective skills that are critical to negotiations." Deborah M. Kolb, More than
Just a Footnote: Constructing a Theoretical Framework for Teaching about Gender in
Negotiation, 16 NEGOTIATION J. 347, 354 (2000).
125. Debate has arisen over whether the mediator should guard against and correct
inequalities in bargaining power by taking a position on the fairness of the outcome, since doing
so affects the mediator's neutrality. Hill, supra note 49, at 351-52. See also Jonathan M. Hyman,
Swimming in the Deep End: Dealing with Justice in Mediation, 6 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 19, 22 (2004).
126. Craver & Barnes, supra note 117, at 315.
127. Id.
128. See Eyster, supra note 44, at 760 (noting the same behavior in law students taking
traditional negotiation classes).
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up on the process and declare impasse. Gradually, this type of resistance
has diminished, but it still surfaces occasionally.
Women lawyers and younger male lawyers showed some initial reluc-
tance to express themselves candidly and to allow their clients to speak
openly in my presence, but on the whole they quickly learned to trust in the
mediation process to level the negotiation playing field. These lawyers
have recognized that the mediation process provides a more supportive, less
confrontational environment for them and their clients than traditional
negotiation does. The mediator's expectation of cooperation frees these
lawyers to practice in a manner consistent with their natural inclinations.
They and their clients actually fare better in a mediation environment than
lawyers and clients who resist the call for cooperation. By trusting in the
process and cooperating fully, they negotiate more effectively. 
129
V. FACILITATIVE MEDIATION: THE INFUSION OF CARE INTO
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
During the course of a Federal Judicial Center program for ADR
administrators that I attended a few years ago, a female judge inquired what
had ever happened to the "counselor of law" aspect of the practice of law.
She lamented that only the advocacy role seems to have survived. Coun-
selors of law, of course, strive to advise the client holistically, taking into
account all of the client's interests and needs, present and future, not just
the merits of the client's legal position in the dispute at hand. Likewise,
advocates of therapeutic law practice urge a style of lawyering and judging
that stresses development of a relationship of respect and trust through
empathetic, personal conversation with the client.130 The client's best inter-
ests may not always coincide with fully pressing the client's legal position.
Sometimes a client's greatest need is "plain talk ... about the need for that
client to reconcile a torn relationship or to be more respecting or charitable
toward another person." 131 The roles of counselor of law and therapeutic
legal practitioner represent a care-based approach to the practice of law. In
the context of dispute resolution processes, proponents of a care-based
approach offer mediation as a dispute resolution process that fulfills many
of the characteristics of the ethic of care. 132
129. Id. at 775.
130. Barton, supra note 42, at 941-42; David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the
Rehabilitative Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 743, 748 (2005).
131. Barton, supra note 42, at 942.
132. Cahn, supra note 32, at 1048.
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One definition of conflict says conflict "arises whenever there is a
failure of connection, collaboration, or community, an ability to understand
our essential interconnectedness ..... 133 Facilitative mediation addresses
this conceptualization of conflict by incorporating the contextual related-
ness of the ethic of care into the dispute resolution process.134 Mediation, if
practiced facilitatively, is directed to persons, not to law. 135 It opens up the
dialogue, rather than limiting it to legal issues encompassed in the dis-
pute.136 This allows the participants to address not just the legal dispute,
but also the problem(s) that led to the dispute.137 Essentially, facilitative
mediation "promises to consider disputes in terms of relationships and
responsibility," 138 rather than objectively relying on external rules. Facili-
tative mediation employs a contextual approach based on the parties' needs
and interests, rather than a narrow approach limited to the legal issues
presented in the dispute. 139 Such mediation also relies on cooperation, not
competition. It is also voluntary, not coercive.140 Finally, facilitative me-
diation empowers the parties to express themselves and to make their own
decisions, rather than imposing "the hierarchy of dominance that character-
izes the judge/litigant and lawyer/client relationships."l4 l Participants not
only may speak for themselves, but may "speak in a language which is
familiar to them."142 They can enlarge the sum-zero environment of litiga-
tion by crafting their own customized remedies.
Like the solution proposed by Amy to the Heinz moral dilemma,
mediation offers:
a dialogue-centered process; the more the parties speak for them-
selves, and to each other, the more likely they will agree on some
resolution. They may even reconcile, which seldom occurs in a
winner-take-all adversarial process.... Mediation works to make
peace rather than foment retaliation. And mediation, if done
133. KENNETH CLOKE, MEDIATING DANGEROUSLY: THE FRONTIERS OF CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 6 (2001).
134. Hill, supra note 49, at 374.
135. McCabe, supra note 73, at 471.
136. ROSENBAUM, supra note 41, at 243.
137. Portia Redux, supra note 40, at 110.
138. Grillo, supra note 74, at 1548.
139. McCabe, supra note 73, at 472-74.
140. Grillo, supra note 74, at 1548. Grillo criticizes mediation when it is mandatory, since it
loses all its positive care-based virtues in the coercive environment. Id. at 1549-50.
141. Grillo, supra note 74, at 1548.
142. McCabe, supra note 73, at 471.
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properly, resolves disputes by opening up the story rather than
shutting it down. 143
Incorporating an ethic-of-care perspective into the practice of law can-
not help but effect change in the dispute resolution process, and vice versa:
facilitative mediation's infusion of relational problem solving into legal
dispute resolution is changing the practice of law. 144 This style of media-
tion offers an environment in which the perspective of care can flourish.
The inclusiveness of the facilitative process allows the participants to trans-
form the pirate game and the neighbor game into the pirate-neighbor game.
Some criticize mediation as essentially a process for compromise,
where the parties give up their rights instead of vindicating their rights.145
It is true that mediated settlements, as any other settlements, can and often
do involve compromise, but compromise does not necessarily require
capitulation. As the pirate-neighbor story illustrates, an inclusive solution
can accommodate the interests of both parties to a conflict. Under the girl's
proposal, she continues to play neighbors and the boy continues to play
pirates; they play their roles of choice together in a new game. They have
reformed their relationship to accommodate both their interests. "The two
children create the new game together, create the rules of play together, and
explore the possible resolutions together."146 Mediation participants face a
challenge to broaden their focus beyond the legal issues and to undertake a
search for inclusive solutions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Mediation is not a perfect dispute resolution process. 147 While media-
tion has its drawbacks, it represents the best process available within the
adversarial legal system today for injecting relational, care-oriented reason-
ing into problem solving. The explosion of mediation in legal dispute reso-
lution within the past twenty years is no accident.148 As the number of
143. ROSENBAUM, supra note 41, at 243.
144. Cahn, supra note 32, at 1043-50.
145. Laura Nader, for instance, has criticized mediation and other forms of ADR as "peace
over justice." Stempel, supra note 67, at 349. I agree that mediation, or any other form of settle-
ment, may not be an appropriate resolution for some disputes, for instance, those that involve
issues of public policy. Adjudication and imposition of objective rules have their place and
should not be replaced entirely by mediation.
146. Hill, supra note 49, at 370.
147. The mediation process is subject to manipulation by participants who do not approach it
cooperatively, in good faith. It can become simply a vehicle by which the parties feel pressured to
give up their claims or defenses, whether out of the financial strain of litigation or pressure from
the court to settle. Finally, the development of public jurisprudence suffers when the parties
resolve their own disputes.
148. Mitchell Lecture, supra note 5, at 54 (remarks of Carrie Menkel-Meadow).
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women attorneys has grown from a mere novelty segment of the bar to a
significant force, the profession has been exposed to a more relational ap-
proach to clients and their problems, particularly in the preference of female
attorneys for a less confrontational, contextual, care-based approach to
dispute resolution.t 49 Practicing law from an ethic-of-care perspective
"challenge[s] the most deeply rooted paradigms of law-the adversary
system as we know it and its professional dominance of and distance from
the client."150
Mediation has not grown in popularity solely because of the increasing
presence of women and the awakening ethic of care in male lawyers;
economic factors such as litigation cost and delay engendered by crowded
dockets have likely provided a significant impetus for the mediation explo-
sion. Yet, the contribution of care-based practice should not be dis-
counted.15' Growing acceptance of the different approach women bring to
the profession152 and the subtle (or, maybe not so subtle) push of care-
minded lawyers has caused a shift from the win-lose dichotomy of litigation
toward the client-driven, relational approach of mediation. There are no
empirical studies on the issue, but it seems apparent that as the number of
attorneys who are more temperamentally suited for mediation enter the
profession, among them a growing percentage of women, 153 the preference
for mediation and other inclusive, non-confrontational dispute resolution
methods will continue to grow.
This does not mean dispute resolution through adjudication is headed
toward extinction. Decisions by judges and juries should and will continue
to hold a critical place in our legal system.154 But, there is room for both a
rights-based approach and a care-based approach to dispute resolution. As
149. Cahn, supra note 32, at 1044-45 (citing the conclusion by Stacy Caplow and Shira
Scheindlin following their study of female law graduates); Freyer, supra note 46, at 217; Menkel-
Meadow, Culture Clash, supra note 60, at 639.
150. Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices, supra note 58, at 45.
151. Grillo, supra note 74, at 1548, 1601.
152. Stempel, supra note 67, at 311-12. Though Professor Stempel's comments are some-
what tongue-in-cheek, he does admit to a personal view that women lawyers' thinking is "less
linear and more flexible," resulting in more creativity, and that women lawyers show more
sensitivity to relationship between the parties and the relational nature of their dispute. Id. at 311.
153. See id. at 311-12; Stephen N. Subrin, Perspectives on Dispute Resolution in the Twenty-
First Century: A Traditionalist Looks at Mediation: It's Here to Stay and Much Better than I
Thought, 3 NEV. L.J. 196, 207-08 (2002/2003).
154. See Stempel, supra note 67, at 349-50 (referring to the work of Laura Nader, a critic of
mediation as promoting agreement for the sake of agreement, which does reduce conflict, but also
lessens the opportunity for judicial decision making to contribute to social development). See also
Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification in the
Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 1, 1 (1993); Laura Nader,
A Reply to Professor King, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 99, 101 (1994).
[VOL. 81:771
A JUDICIAL MEDIATOR'S PERSPECTIVE
Carol Gilligan says, "The inclusion of two voices in moral discourse, in
thinking about conflicts, and in making choices, transforms the dis-
course." 155 "This inclusive approach allows greater creativity in society and
keeps the one voice from overwhelming and silencing the other. It allows
society to meet the needs of both perspectives without compromising."156
We should continue to cultivate conflict resolution methods that value the
voices of both pirates and neighbors.
155. Mitchell Lecture, supra note 5, at 45 (remarks of Carol Gilligan).
156. Hill, supra note 49, at 370.
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